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CRIMINAL LAW-CRIMINAL CONTEMPT-
JUDGE'S DILEMMA
In November of 1966, Richard Mayberry and two co-defendants came
to trial for prison breach before Judge Fick in a Pennsylvania criminal
court. The defendants, at their own request, represented themselves;
but, were also advised by court appointed counsel. On the first day of
the trial Mayberry said, "It seems like the court has the intention of
railroading us"' and he subsequently moved to disqualify the judge.
Upon denial of the motion, the petitioner started by referring to the
judge as a "hatchet man for the State", 2 and ended, by referring to him
as a "dirty sonofabitch." After a peaceful week, trouble again erupted
between the petitioner and the judge. During questioning by one of the
co-defendants, the prosecutor objected to one of the questions. When
the judge sustained the objection the record shows the petitioner say-
ing, "you ought to be Gilbert and Sullivan the way you sustain the dis-
trict attorney every time he objects to the questions."'4  The petitioner
then added a description of the judge as a "dirty tyrannical old dog."5
The trial proceeded in this manner with further insults and profanity.
On numerous occasions the petitioner was ejected from the courtroom.
Finally, as the court prepared to charge the jury, the petitioner advised
the court:
he [the petitioner] wishes to make it known to the Court now that he has no
intention of remaining silent while the Court charges the jury, and he is
going to continually object to the charge of the Court to the jury throughout
the entire charge, and he is not going to remain silent. He is going to dis-
rupt the proceedings verbally throughout the entire charge of the Court, and
also he is going to be objecting to being forced to terminate his defense before
he was finished.6
The court thereupon had the petitioner removed; later when he returned,
gagged, he created such a commotion that the court again had him re-
moved to an adjacent room where a loudspeaker made the proceedings
1. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 456 (1971).
2. Id. at 456.
3. Id. at 456.
4. Id. at 457.
5. id. at 457.
6. Id. at 462.
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audible to him. The trial ended with a jury verdict of guilty. Prior
to sentencing on the verdict, the judge pronounced Mayberry guilty of
criminal contempt. He found that the petitioner had committed one or
more instances of contempt on eleven of the twenty-one days of the
trial and sentenced him to not less than one, nor more than two years,
for each of the eleven contempts, the sentences to run consecutively.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed by a divided vote.7
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United
States said:
Our conclusion is that by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment a defendant in criminal contempt proceedings should be given a
public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor ....
In the present case that requirement can be satisfied only if the judgement of
contempt is vacated so that on remand another judge, not bearing the sting
of these slanderous remarks and having the impersonal authority of the law,
sits in judgement on the conduct of the petitioner as shown by the record.S
By way of obiter dictum Justice Douglas added:
A judge cannot be driven out of a case. Where, however, he does not act the
instant the contempt is committed, but waits until the end of the trial, on
balance, it is generally wise where the marks of the unseemly conduct have left
personal stings to ask a fellow judge to take his place. 9
Justice Black concurred, but took exception to the part of the decison
stating that a judge, without a jury, could have convicted Mayberry in-
stantaneously with the outburst. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 397 U.S.
1020 (1971).
The Supreme Court in Mayberry1° has for the first time stated that a
judge, who is personally reviled by the contumacious acts or words of
a defendant or attorney, and who chooses not to sentence "the instant the
contempt is committed,"" relinquishes his right to punish at all to an-
other judge. This note is an attempt to trace the current direction of
judicial thought in the United States in the area of criminal contempt
and to put in perspective the effect of recent restraints on judicial au-
thority.
American law, both by statute and judicial precedent, has not viewed
contempt of court as a monolithic wrong; but, rather has divided it into
differently treated categories. The particular category has a substantial
7. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969).
8. Supra note 1 at 466.
9. Supra note 1 at 463.
10. Supra note 1 at 456.
11. Supra note 1 at 463.
[Vol. XXI1124
19721 CASE NOTES 1125
bearing on the options available to the trial judge and the protections
guaranteed the contemnor. The actual location of the act itself deter-
mines the distinction between the two categories--direct contempt, "com-
mitted in the actual presence of the court,"' 12 and indirect contempt.
This distinction is rather straightforward and usually easily discernible.
However, both of these types of contempt are subdivided into civil and
criminal contempt. If the sentence is penal in nature, the contempt is
criminal; if the sentence is coercive the contempt is civil. It is necessary
to bear these distinctions in mind to weigh the relevance of prior court
decisions. Mayberry13 is an instance of direct criminal contempt.
The summary contempt power of the judiciary can move with enough
momentum to maim or destroy individual liberty and rights. It is also
the historical cornerstone and foundation of courtroom control and dig-
nity. One of the primary differences between Chancery and common
law courts was the power of enforcing a judgment. In the common
law courts "the judgment did not originally command the defendant to
do anything but was simply that the plaintiff recovers his damages.
Failure to satisfy the judgment was therefore not contempt of court."'14
The orders of these courts were made in the name of the King and "in
legal theory it was the direct command of the King to his subject to do
or refrain from doing certain things."'15 Thus, to be found in contempt
of these courts was to be in contempt of a King's decree. Punishment
was unlimited and the court's power was seen at its most awesome level.
Contempt power of this nature eventually spread to all the English
courts and covered more contumacious acts.
The courts of the American colonies inherited the English concept of
contempt. After the American Revolution summary contempt power
was legislatively enshrined by the Act of September 24, 1789:
"[C]ourts of the United States shall have power .. . to punish by fine
or imprisonment, at the discretion of the said courts, all contempts of
authority .. "16 This was narrowed to "misbehaviour of any person
or persons in the presence of the said courts. . .,17 in 1831. It is clear
at this point in history that both the courts and the legislatures in the
United States were primarily concerned with the criminal aspects of con-
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a).
13. Supra note 1.
14. M. VAN HECKE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES, 3 (1959).
15. Id.
16. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 87.
17. Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487-488.
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tempt. If the contemnor misbehaved in the "presence of the court,"
the court needed the right to punish him summarily. It would require
later developments before the courts would consider the merits and dan-
gers of coercive civil sentencing.
The current summary powers of the federal courts are derived from
the rule making powers of the United States Supreme Court.' 8 The
individual states have statutes governing criminal contempt and guidelines
on the exercise of judicial summary powers. 19 State legislatures, in the
last twenty-five years, have made deep cuts into the summary power of
the state courts. However, the federal court system has not had any
legislative restrictions imposed on penalties for summary punishment of
direct criminal contempt.
The United States Supreme Court has also inherited the common
law, equitable view of the need for strong summary powers in the
hands of judges. No judicial restraints were evident through all of the
nineteenth century. As late as the last three decades of that century,
the Supreme Court stood intransient. In 187320 an attorney, who re-
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a).
19. Twenty-eight states have established maximum terms of imprisonment for
criminal contempts for some of their courts: Alabama: circuit court-5 days,
ALA. CODE tit. 13 § 9 (1959); Alaska: six months, ALASKA STAT. tit. 9 § 09.50.020
(1962); Arizona: six months, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-341 (1956); Arkansas:
ten days, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-902 (1962); Connecticut: six months, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-33 (1960); Hawaii: circuit court-thirty days in summary
proceedings, two years after jury trial, HAWAII REV. LAWS § 729-1 (1968); Idaho:
five days, IDAHO CODE § 7-610 (1969); Indiana: three months, IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 3-906 (1968); Iowa: six months, IOWA CODE § 665.4 (1950); Kentucky: thirty
hours, Ky. REv. STAT. § 432.260 (1970); Louisiana: thirty days, LA. REV. STAT.
§ 13-4611 (1968); Michigan: thirty days, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27a.1715 (1962);
Minnesota: six months, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 588.10 (1947); Mississippi: thirty
days, MISS. CODE ANN. § 1656 (1957); Montana: five days, MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 93-9810 (1964); Nevada: twenty-five days, NEV. REV. STAT. § 22.100
(1963); New York: thirty days, N.Y. JUDICIARY LAWS § 751.1 (1968); North
Carolina: thirty days, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-4 (1969); North Dakota: thirty
days, N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-2 (1960); Ohio: ten days, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2705.05 (1954); Oregon: six months, ORE. REV. STAT. § 33.020 (1969); Ten-
nessee: ten days-special provision for profanity, twenty-four hours, TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-903, 23-907 (1956); Texas: three days, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
arts. 1911, 1955 (1962); Utah: thirty days, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-32-10 (1953);
Virginia: ten days in summary proceedings, VA. CODE ANN. 18.1-295 (1960);
Washington: six months, WASH. RaV. CODE § 7.020.020 (1961); West Virginia:
ten days in summary proceedings, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-5-26 (1966); Wis-
consin: thirty days, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 256.06 (1971); and three states have a
statutory maximum on the basis of declaring criminal contempt as a misdemeanor:
CALIF. PENAL CODE § 166 (West 1970); State v. Janiec, 25 N.J. Super. 197,
95 A.2d 762 (1962); S.D. COMp. LAWS § 16-15-2 (1969).
20. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873).
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fused, in terms that were "grossly and intentionally disrespectful," 21 to
obey a court order to answer a judicial inquiry in writing was ordered
disbarred. The Supreme Court reversed declaring that summary power
was limited to fine and imprisonment. However, Justice Field, explain-
ing the need for strong summary power, said, "the power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preser-
vation of order in judicial proceedings. '22
In 188828 Justice Harlan went further. In this case a marshal, ex-
ecuting an order to remove Althea Terry, was attacked and beaten with
a deadly weapon in the courtroom by David S. Terry. While upholding
Terry's six month summary sentence, Justice Harlan said, "that
[summary] power cannot be denied [the courts] . . .without inviting
or causing such obstruction to the orderly and impartial administration
of justice as would endanger the rights and safety of the entire com-
munity."'24  The legal rationalization for this power in the United States
has been the view that the courts have taken of the contumacious act
itself. "Historically, criminal contempt has been considered to be a
sui generis in that it is not a crime but is punishable by criminal sanc-
tions."25
Labor's disregard of court injunctions in the early twentieth century
required a new examination of judicial interpretation of contempt. In
Gompers v. Bucks Range Stove Co.,26 Gompers was enjoined from boy-
cotting or publishing any statement declaring a boycott against the com-
pany. When he ignored the injunction, the Supreme Court appointed
a commission to inquire into his activities. Because it was an indirect
contempt, summary power was not available; but, the question of classi-
fication of his acts sui generis as criminal, became important.
Justice Holmes in Gompers v. United States27 classified intentional
violations of a court injunction as "criminal" acts for the first time.
28
The Court ruled that since the acts were criminal, the normal criminal
21. Id. at 507.
22. Id. at 510.
23. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
24. Id. at 309.
25. Besette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326 (1904).
26. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
27. 233 U.S. 604 (1914).
28. Id. at 610-11. "If such acts are not criminal, we are in error as to the most
fundamental characteristic of crimes as that word has been understood in English
speech. So truly are they crimes that it seems to be proved that in early law they
were punished only by the usual criminal procedure .. "
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defense of the statute of limitations applied and Gompers' conviction
was reversed. Implied in this decision was that, at least, in indirect
criminal contempt some of the normal criminal safeguards are requited.
It would be thirty-five years before the Court would apply this thinking
to direct criminal contempt, but the first cut into judicial summary powers
was at last made.
In 1948, the Court in Oliver29 expanded the Gompers decision30 in a
case growing out of Michigan's "one-man grand jury" law.Al In a con-
fusion of issues arising out of testimony before a judge, who was sitting
as a one-man grand jury, the judge combined all aspects of direct and
indirect contempt with all aspects of criminal and civil sentencing. Based
on the testimony of other witnesses unheard by Oliver, the judge felt that
one witness had given false testimony. The judge reasoned, however,
that the contempt was direct, and summarily sentenced Oliver in a secret
proceeding in which Oliver had none of the criminal safeguards the
Gompers Court would have given him. He was sentenced to "be con-
fined . . . until such time as he . . . shall appear and answer questions
heretofore propounded to him by this court .... -32 Subsequently, be-
fore the Supreme Court, Justice Black recognized the need under the due
process clause for a " . . . reasonable opportunity to defend '33 against
indirect contempts; but, by way of dicta, he also affirmed a narrow ex-
ception to "due process" protection in direct contempt actions for "mis-
conduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturb the
court's business."
34
The following year Justice Douglas, with Justice Black's concurrence,
in a dissenting opinion sounded the first warning about the use of sum-
mary power in direct, criminal contempt actions, "But its [summary
power] exercise must be narrowly confined lest it become an instrument
of tyranny. '3
5
Just as labor problems had caused a re-evaluation of judicial thought
concerning contempt, the political trials of Communists during the 1950's
under the Smith Act,36 created a new turbulence in the court room.
29. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
30. Supra note 27.
31. MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.943-28.946 (1956).
32. Supra note 29, at 260.
33. Supra note 29, at 273.
34. Supra note 29, at 275.
35. Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 163 (1949).
36. 18 U.S.C. 2385 (1970).
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In the Sacher 7 case, a majority of the Court still upheld summary
sentencing at the end of a trial for contumacious conduct during the
trial.38 But the Court went further by not limiting summary punish-
ment to "such minor contempts as leave the judge indifferent. '3 9  Jus-
tice Frankfurter was the spokesman for the dissent and heralded future
thinking of the Court. Frankfurter indicated that when the judge is
personally involved in the contumacious acts, he should permit another
judge to hear the contempt charges and thereby avoid combining "in
himself the functions of accuser and judge."' 40  Second, summary power
should only be used where the act requires immediate action by the
judge. "Interruption for a hearing before a separate judge would disrupt
the trial and thus achieve the illicit purpose of the contemnors.
' 41
Two years later in Offitt v. United States,4 2 Justice Frankfurter, speak-
ing for the majority of the court, set aside a summary criminal sentence
for direct contempt where the judge "sitting in judgment on such a mis-
behaving lawyer . . . [gave] vent to personal spleen or respond[ed]
to a personal grievance."' 43  Justices Black and Douglas, concurring,
added that a contemnor in such a situation should be afforded a jury
trial.44  Here, the Court, in a case involving a judge who became em-
broiled with a defense attorney to the extent that he showed "personal
animosity" and "lack of proper judicial restraint", 45 marked the begin-
ning of an acceptance of the Douglas dissent in Sacher.
4 6
In another political trial under the Smith Act, 47 the Court involved
itself in the question of jury trial for criminal contempt. Here the con-
temnor, released on bail, refused to surrender. When he was appre-
hended, he was tried for indirect criminal contempt. The politics and
public interest in the case, perhaps, temporarily tempered the changing
attitude of the Court towards summary criminal contempt power. The
37. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
38. Id. at 10. "If the conduct of these lawyers warranted immediate summary
punishment on dozens of occasions, no possible prejudice to them can result from
delaying it until the end of the trial.
39. Id. at 12.
40. Id. at 28.
41. Id. at 37.
42. 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
43. Id. at 14.
44. Id. at 18.
45. Id. at 11.
46. Supra note 37.
47. Supra note 36.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Court held in Green v. United States48 that a three year sentence for
contempt, without a jury, was justifiable. 49  Here Justice Frankfurter
said, "[W]hat is indisputable is that from the foundation of the United
States the constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt without
the intervention of a jury has never been doubted."50 But, Justice Black
with Justice Douglas dissented, reasoning that summary power,
has relentlessly swollen, at the hands of not unwilling judges, until it has be-
come a drastic persuasive mode of administering criminal justice usurping our
regular constitutional methods of trying those charged with offenses against society. 5'
The basis of these dissents is found in Holmes' labeling of contempt as
"criminal" in Gompers case and recommending the requirement of crim-
inal procedures.
Two cases before the 1964 Court dealt with the same problem and re-
fined it still further. In Ungar v. Sarafite,5"2 Justice White, speaking for
the majority, upheld a sentence because the contemnor's criticism of the
court's ruling and failure to obey its orders did not constitute a personal
attack on the judge. However, Justice Goldberg now joined Justices
Black and Douglas in dissenting:
An impartial judge, not caught up in the cross-currents of emotions enveloping
the contempt charge, is the only one who can protect all rights and determine
whether a contempt was committed or whether the case is either one of judicial
nerves on edge or of judicial tyranny.53
In his dissent, Justice Goldberg carefully outlined the position that was
later to be taken by the majority in Mayberry.5 4  It differed substan-
48. 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
49. Id. at 190. The Supreme Court has upheld summary punishment in the
following: Ex parte Kearney, 21 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 37 (1822); In re Chilies,
89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 157 (1874); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888); In re
Savin, 131 U.S. 367 (1893); In re Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280 (1889); In re Swan,
150 U.S. 637 (1893); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896); In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897); Besette v. W.B. Conkey
Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904); Nelson v. United :States, 201 U.S. 92 (1906); United
States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906), 214 U.S. 386 (1909); Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1937); Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402
(1918); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919); Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255
(1923); Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928); Sinclair v. United States,
279 U.S. 749 (1929); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1931); Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. - (1932); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258 (1946); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1950); Sacher v. United States,
352 U.S. 385 (1956); Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
50. Supra note 48 at 190.
51. Supra note 48 at 194.
52. 376 U.S. 575 (1964).
53. Id. at 602.
54. Supra note 1.
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tually from Offit 55 because it applied the measure to a passive judge
who was personally attacked, and no longer limited it to a judge who be-
came actively involved with the contemnor.
In the second case, another political trial, involving the refusal of the
Governor of Mississippi to admit a black student after a court injunction,
the Supreme Court held that the Governor did not have the right to a
jury trial.56 Here Justice Goldberg's dissent goes right to the question
of a "non-trivial penalty" 57 requiring trial by jury. Justice Goldberg
wanted the Court to come to grips with the constitutional issue of "due
process." If contempt was "criminal," and the penalty was non-trivial
(exceeding six months), was not a jury trial required to replace sum-
mary power? The majority of the Court remained unmoved.
In 1966 the Court58 upheld a six month sentence, handed down by
a panel of three judges without a jury and stated:
[T]herefore, in the exercise of the Court's Supervisory Power and under the pecul-
iar power of the federal courts to revise sentences in contempt cases, we rule
further that sentences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may not be
imposed by federal courts absent a jury trial or waiver thereof.5 9
The Court still hedged at basing its decision on "due process" and
acted under its "Supervisory Power," but it did draw a line at six
months. This, however, did not satisfy the dissenters. Justice Harlan
questioned the trial judge's advance decision regarding sentence, as to
whether or not a jury was needed; and Justice Douglas questioned wheth-
er petty depended on the maximum sentence available rather than the
sentence imposed. Nevertheless, Cheff took the question of jury trial
out of its place in minority and dissenting opinions and put it squarely
in the majority.
In 1968, Justice White speaking for the Court,60 put the question to
rest:
Our deliberations have convinced us, however, that serious contempts are so nearly
like other serious crimes that they are subject to the jury trial provisions of the
Constitution, now binding on the States, and that the traditional rule is con-
55. Supra note 42.
56. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
57. Id. at 756.
58. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); Company president convicted
where company refused to obey cease and desist order of F.T.C.
59. Id. at 380.
60. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Contemnor willfully introduced
falsely prepared will to probate-two year sentence reversed.
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stitutionally infirm insofar as it permits other than petty contempts to be tried
without honoring a demand for jury trial.61
In 1970 the Allen6 2 Court discussing a case of a criminal contemnor,
whose behavior exceeded all reasonable bounds, affirmed the conviction
of criminal contempt and advised all judges that,
We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial
judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen (1) bind and gag him,
thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; [and] (3) take him
out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly. 63
By the end of 1970 summary power in direct criminal contempt had
changed radically from the nineteenth century concept. The reasoning
of both majority opinions and dissents, and particularly the reasoning
from indirect contempt actions, had been used to shape the attitude
towards the use of summary power in direct contempt actions. From
the indirect contempt cases, in which the judge had not observed the of-
fense, came: the Gompers decision, defining contumacious acts as crim-
inal and inferring the need for criminal safeguards, and the dissent in
the Green case wherein came the first hints that perhaps a jury would
be needed where sentences were long. Then the Barnett dissent which
recommended using the jury trial requirement for "non-trivial" sen-
tences and the Douglas dissent in Cheff which questioned whether "non-
trivial" should depend on the actual sentence or potential maximum.
Thus, in spite of the fact that this reasoning applied to acts which a judge
did not see, the same result applies to acts which occur in the presence
of the judge.
It will be remembered that the Offitt dissent requested jury trial in
direct contempt for the first time, and the Bloom Court affirmed it.
The Sacher dissent started the movement for requiring a new judge and
the Offitt decision required it, where the judge had been an activist.
Allen inferred that a jury trial might be necessary if the judge waited
for the end of the trial. And now it was time for Mayberry.
Mayberry, growing directly out of Justice Goldberg's dissent in Ungar,
takes this line of decisions one step further. It makes the judge, who
through no fault of his own becomes involved with the obstreperous con-
temnor, relinquish his summary power to another judge. Further, if
the contumacious conduct is severe enough to warrant major sentence,
the referral judge must in turn relinquish some of his inherent power
to a jury.
61. Id. at 198.
62. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
63. Id. at 343.
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Today the trial judge, in a disrupted court, can bind and gag the con-
temnor at the risk of prejudicing a jury, and destroying the image of
democratic justice. Second, he can exclude the offending defendant at
the risk of approaching trial in absentia. Of course, neither of these op-
tions apply to a contemptuous attorney. Third, he can stop the trial
and sentence the contemnor to six months and resume the trial at the
end of this sentence, as many times as the contemnor makes it neces-
sary. Fourth, he can sentence the contemnor civilly, until such time as
the contemnor will return and continue in peace. Finally, he can con-
clude the trial, if possible, and bring charges before another judge and,
if necessary, a jury.
How effective are these alternatives? In a criminal trial, which may
impose a substantial penalty, delays and recalling of witnesses can make
contempts by either defendant or attorney an advantageous tactic.
Shackling or removing defendants can have untold repercussions on ju-
ries. In political trials Justice Douglas feels that the Supreme Court has
"broad supervisory powers over them.' ' 64  This will undoubtedly entail
future decisions. Finally, trials described by Justice Douglas as "trials
used by minorities to destroy the existing constitutional system' 65 will be
almost unaffected by these procedures.
There are several unanswered questions. For example, Harlan raised
the question in Cheff whether the new judge must decide the sentence
before he can determine whether a jury is needed. In addition, Justice
Douglas raised the question in Cheff whether any contempt hearing re-
quires a jury because of the potential of major sentence. Similarly, if
contempt is really a crime, do not the contemnors deserve all the con-
stitutional protections of "due process?" Also unresolved is the effect of
a series of six month consecutive sentences for each contumacious act,
adding up to a major sentence. The effect on judicial control of court-
rooms awaits future resolutions of these questions.
It would appear that the current alternatives open to a trial judge
will not cope with the potential problems facing the balance of the
twentieth century. The problem of balancing the needs of individual
64. Supra note 64 at 353 n.2, accord, Spies v. People, 122 I11. 1, 12 N.E. 865
(1887), involving the Haymarket riot; In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), involving
the Pullman strike; Mooney v. Holohan, 249 U.S. 103 (1918), involving the copper
strikes of 1917; Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 151 N.E. 839 (1958),
259 Mass. 128, 156 N.E. 57 (1959), 261 Mass. 12, 158 N.E. 167 (1959), involving
the Red scare of the 20's; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950), involving
an agreement to teach Marxism.
65. Supra note 64 at 356.
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liberty with freedom from oppressive courts against lack of power by the
judges to maintain orderly courts is by no means easily attained. If
judicial decision and legislative enactment strip the trial judge of power
to control his courtroom, the resulting chaos can impair the effectiveness
of our whole judicial system. Judicial or legislative reaction to such
chaos can result in radical repression of individual rights. The balance
must be found, whether by combination of jury and impartial judges
at the trial level or, strong involved judges, with mandatory appellate re-
view.
Gordon Schneider
